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ABSTRACT 
PRE CONDITIONS OF INFLATION TARGETING 
Başer, Şefika 
MA, Department of Economics 
Supervisor: Ass. Prof. Selin Sayek Böke 
December 2011 
Inflation targeting regime is appeared as a new approach to achieve price stability 
objectives of the central banks. It is started be used at the beginnings of 1990’s. 
Inflation targeting regime is based on an inflation target that is defined and 
announced to public. This regime has changed some structures of central banks. 
Central bank credibility became more important. Transparency came into 
prominence, therefore central banks started to give closer attention to 
communication strategies. This paper aims to define pre conditions of inflation 
targeting together with the history of Turkish economy to set light on the conditions 
that carry Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey to choose inflation targeting 
regime. After communication strategies are defined and communication strategies 
of different central banks are compared in this paper. As being one of the inflation 
targeting central bank, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey is subjected to review 
and advices are given to improve its communication strategies to become more 
effective in applying inflation targeting regime.  
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Key words: Inflation targeting, communication strategies, interest rate projections, 
central bank transparency 
 
 
 
v 
ÖZET 
ENFLASYON HEDEFLEMESİNİN ÖN KOŞULLARI 
Başer, Şefika 
MA, Ekonomi Bölümü 
Danışman: Ass. Prof. Selin Sayek Böke 
Aralık 2011 
 
Enflasyon hedeflemesi rejimi, merkez bankalarının fiyat istikrarı hedefine ulaşmakta 
kullandıkları yeni bir yöntem olarak 1990’ların başlarında ortaya çıkmıştır. Enflasyon 
hedeflemesi, enflasyon oranı için bir hedefin belirlenmesi ve kamuoyuna 
duyurulmasına dayanır. Bu rejim, merkez bankalarında bazı yapısal değişiklikler 
gerektirmiştir. Merkez bankası güvenilirliğinin önemi artmış, şeffaflık ön plana 
çıkmış, bu nedenle merkez bankaları iletişim stratejilerine daha fazla itina etmeye 
başlamışlardır. Bu makalede, enflasyon hedeflemesi rejiminin ön koşullarını 
tanımlanarak Türkiye ekonomisinin kısa geçmişi, Türkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez 
Bankasını enflasyon hedeflemesi rejimini uygulamaya yönlendiren koşullara ışık 
tutması açısından özetlenmiştir. Enflasyon hedeflemesi uygulayan merkez 
bankalarından biri olan Türkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası incelenmiş ve bu 
rejimin daha etkin şekilde uygulanabilmesi için iletişim stratejileri açısından 
tavsiyelerde bulunulmuştur.  
 
 
vi 
Anahtar kelimeler: enflasyon hedeflemesi, iletişim stratejileri, faiz oranı tahminleri, 
merkez bankası şeffaflığı 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
 
 
Starting from 1970’s policy makers, central bankers and economists agree on the 
fact that price stability must be the long run objective of the monetary policy. To be 
able to achieve price stability, inflation targeting regime is started to be used in 
developed and also developing countries from the beginning of 1990’s. To achieve 
and maintain price stability that is the final and prior objective of monetary policy 
for Inflation targeting regime, an inflation target (or target range) is defined by 
central bank and monetary policy is carried consistent with this target and the 
policies applied for this reason are shared with public and financial agents as part of 
transparency and communication procedures. In other words, inflation targeting 
regime means that making central bank’s monetary policy to depend on a pre-
defined numerical inflation target or target range.  
The difference of inflation targeting from the other ways to control inflation is that 
monetary policy tools try to control future inflation instead of past or present 
inflation. Another difference is that inflation target is announced clearly to the 
public and central bank take direct responsibility about it. 
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There are mainly three pre conditions of inflation targeting. The first condition is 
monetary policy focus on price stability. Second one is central bank independence 
and third advanced financial markets. Monetary authority aims 
only to achieve defined inflation target. It means that objectives such as growth, 
employment level or exchange rate must not be chosen as a long run objective. To 
successfully apply the regime and keep inflation at the target level, effectiveness of 
the tools used by monetary authority depends on the advanced money, capital and 
exchange rate markets. Financial markets’ not giving quickly responds to monetary 
policy tools results in deviations from the targeted inflation.  
The objective of this paper is to discuss the properties of inflation targeting regime 
and examine the factors that affect Turkish economic authorities to apply inflation 
targeting. Moreover communication strategies are discused and new approaches 
are subjected to review in order to find if they are appropriate or not to Turkish 
economy.  
The first part of my work is the definition of inflation targeting. It is a brief review of 
literature. The basics of inflation targeting are given in this part. In addition 
historical facts that entail countries to start implementing inflation targeting are 
explained briefly. 
In the second part, pre-requisites of inflation targeting regime are given. This part is 
separated to five sub-parts. These are central bank independence, transparency and 
credibility, having only one target, achieving fiscal discipline and finally having 
related and effective instruments. 
The third part of the thesis is about economic history of Turkey before and after 
implementation of inflation targeting regime. History is studied in five periods. 
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1980-1989 period, 1989-1994 period, 1994-2002 period, 2002-2006 period and 
2006-2011 period. Which factors affected Turkish economy and inflation rate and 
how monetary authorities replied to these factors are explained.  
The next part is a comparison about the communication strategies of Central Bank 
of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) with two other inflation targeting central banks. 
These are Central Bank of Norway (Norges Bank) (NB) and National Bank of Poland 
(NBP). The reason behind the selection of the two central banks is that Norges Bank 
represents an industrial country and NBP represents a developing country. 
Moreover, two central banks are also inflation targeters like CBRT. Two main 
differences between NB and CBRT are defined. These are press conferences and 
interest rate publications. CBRT is suggested to implement press conferences 
directly, but take some steps before implementing interest rate forecasts. 
Moreover, one difference is defined between the communication strategies of CBRT 
and NBP which is publishing the voting results of Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) 
meetings. CBRT is suggested to improve its transparency by means of publishing 
voting results of MPC meetings. 
Although there are many paper written on the pre-conditions of inflation targeting 
regime in Turkey especially during the transition period, the studies on 
communication strategies is quite limited in Turkey. This thesis about “pre-
conditions of inflation targeting; comparison of communication strategies” is 
desired to constitute a take-off to new studies and contribute to economical 
literature on this subject. Moreover it is aimed to light on the future decisions by 
evaluating the developments on communication strategies of different countries. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
DEFINITION OF INFLATION TARGETING 
 
 
 
After the stagflation crisis of 1970’s, inflation and unemployment problems became 
the prior objectives of monetary policies for world economy. Having been started to 
experience the two problems together although they were thought as the 
alternatives of each other, bring new questions about fighting against inflation for 
both economic theory and policy applications. The undesirable impacts of inflation 
on the economic growth and resource allocation are widely accepted among all 
economists. With the realization of even the moderate levels of inflation have bad 
effects on growth and economical activity; there is a consensus about price stability 
for being the necessary condition to achieve the other objectives of monetary policy 
(low unemployment and high growth rate). Duman (2002) says that “Manipulating 
the monetary policy instruments to attain other goals, such as output growth and 
employment, has the peril of an inflationary bias.” (Duman, 2002) The definition of 
the desired price stability is given by former chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank 
Greenspan (2001) as: “Price stability obtains when economic agents no longer take 
account of the prospective change in the general price level in their economic 
decision making” (p. 1).  
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To obtain price stability countries try to reach low and stable inflation levels. 
Kadıoğlu et al. (2000) mention about the importance of low and stable inflation for 
market- 
driven growth and about the monetary policy’s being the most direct tool for 
controlling inflation.  
From the beginnings of 1970’s both developed and developing countries choose 
monetary measures and exchange rate as nominal anchor and conduct their 
monetary policies by using these two variables. However, integrated national 
markets with globally liberalized capital movements and financial crises of 1990’s 
have showed the disadvantages of monetary targeting and exchange rate targeting. 
The new approach “inflation targeting” started to take place of the old approaches 
for many developed and developing countries. The monetary strategy that is 
focused on price stability, helps policy makers to communicate about their intention 
on one hand, on the other hand creates discipline and accountability to central 
bank and government. 
There are two main characteristics of inflation targeting that differentiate it from 
the other regimes. One of the characteristics is not having any other economic 
targets that are conflicting with inflation targeting. Second characteristic is trying to 
achieve a target that will be effective in future not today. Since future inflation is 
partly determined by today’s expectations, central bank can only influence 
expected future inflation. Therefore, central banks alter the monetary conditions to 
influence expected inflation and bring the actual inflation in line with the targeted 
inflation rate. Besides, Duman (2002) states a superiority of inflation targeting as 
“contrary to exchange rate targeting, inflation targeting allows the central banks to 
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have greater discretionary power to respond to shocks of both domestic and 
foreign origin” (p. 3). In order to inflation targeting to be applicable an inflation 
target must be chosen that is not far away from the expectations and is possible to 
reach.  
One of the most famous definitions of inflation targeting is given by Miskin. He 
enumerates five elements of inflation targeting: 
1. A mid-term numerical target should be announced to public for future inflation. 
2. The previous objective of central bank must be inflation; the other targets must 
have secondary importance. 
3. When deciding which monetary policy should be used, not only monetary size 
or foreign exchange rates but also the other indicators must be followed. 
4. Central bank should be in connection with public and markets about plans, aims 
and decisions of monetary authority by enlarged transparency of monetary 
policy.  
5. More independence and more responsibility must be given to central bank to be 
able to reach the targeted inflation. 
Although inflation targeting regime became popular for many countries, especially 
who experienced the disadvantages of exchange rate targeting and monetary 
measures in designing price stability, it is not very easy to successfully apply 
inflation targeting regime directly to every country. Inflation targeting regime has 
some pre-requisites to be applied successfully. Many developed countries have 
these pre-conditions already but some developing countries may not have these 
conditions. Next chapter describes the pre-requisites for inflation targeting regime. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
PRE-CONDITIONS FOR INFLATION TARGETING REGIME 
 
 
 
 Although inflation targeting regime seems desirable for achieving price stability, a 
country must have some pre-conditions to prosper with inflation targeting regime. 
Many research and papers can be found in the literature about the conditions of 
inflation targeting regime. In literature developed countries and developing 
countries are studied separately about their adaptation and success of inflation 
targeting regime, for example Batini and Laxton (Batini & Laxton, 2007); Fraga, 
Goldfajn and Minela (Arminio Fraga, 2003); Kara (Kara A. H., 2006); Kadıoğlu, 
Özdemir and Yılmaz (Kadıoğlu, Özdemir, & Yılmaz, 2000); Khan (Khan, 2003); 
Masson, Savastano and Sharma (Paul R. Masson, 1998); Mishkin (Mishkin, 
INFLATION TARGETING IN EMERGING MARKET COUNTRIES, 2000); Mishkin and 
Hebel (Frederic S. Mishkin, 2006); Özdemir (Özdemir, 2005) etc. studied developed 
and developing countries separately. Most of the researchers agree on the fact that, 
developed countries already have the necessary conditions, but a developing 
country must effectuate some reforms before starting inflation targeting. Duman 
(2002) asserts that “in order to implement inflation targeting effectively, an 
inflation targeting central bank must have a forward looking perspective, and must 
construct conditional inflation forecasts in order to decide upon the current 
instrument setting” (p. 4).  
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Although Batini et al. (2007) investigate if the pre-conditions are necessary to be 
successful in practice and find out the fact that none of the developing inflation 
targeters on their sample met pre-conditions suggests that failure to meet them is 
not by itself an impediment to the adoption and success of inflation targeting, it is 
worth to talk about the pre conditions of inflation targeting. This is because they 
conclude that “even if meeting institutional and technical standards may not be 
critical before inflation targeting is adopted, a proactive approach to making 
improvements by the central bank and other parts of government after adopting 
targeting may be essential to ensure the conditions needed for success.” (p. 27). 
The most common pre-conditions of inflation targeting are; an independent central 
bank, achieving transparency and credibility, not having any other economic targets 
that are conflicting with inflation targeting, achieving fiscal discipline in line with the 
monetary policy’s movements towards the needs of inflation targeting, and having 
monetary policy instruments that are related with and effective on inflation 
targeting. 
3.1. Central Bank Independence 
It is not wrong to say that the most important pre condition before starting inflation 
targeting is an independent central bank. Because central bank must be able to use 
its instruments to reach targeted inflation and achieve price stability without been 
exposed to the pressure of political authority. Batini (2007) says that “The central 
bank must have full legal autonomy and be free from fiscal and political pressure 
that create conflicts with the inflation objective” (Batini & Laxton, 2007). We can 
talk about central bank independence if central bank has the ability to control and 
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change monetary policy when necessary without being affected by political 
pressure. This does not mean that central bank is totally separated from 
government’s general economic program. On the contrary, central bank should 
follow policies that are not conflicting with general economic program. 
Central bank independence can be investigated under two parts, one is physical and 
legal independence and the second is instruments and objective independence. 
Legal independence is about the law of central bank that regularizes the 
relationship between the government and central bank. Appointment, deposition 
and term of office of central bank’s governor, objectives of central bank, lending 
conditions of central bank to the public sector etc are regulated with the law of 
central bank. Central bank can be said to be independent as soon as it is not 
affected by any possible intervention by government or other public institutions. 
Having high public sector deficits because of government policies and financing 
these deficits by central bank resources is the leader of the problems that threatens 
price stability. A central bank that is able to say ‘no’ to inconvenient government 
policies is very important for adopting inflation targeting successfully. When there is 
a fiscal dominance and this result monetary policy to be designed for the financial 
needs of government, central bank’s prior objective cannot be price stability and it 
gets harder to reach targeted inflation. 
An independent central bank must be operationally independent. Operational 
independence means that central bank should be able to use all its instruments 
freely for reaching the targeted inflation. Instrument independence makes it 
necessary to have a stabilized and strong financial sector. To be able to reach 
targeted inflation, monetary policy must be dominant to fiscal policies. In other 
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words, fiscal policy must not be dictated its applications or limited monetary 
policy’s affects. 
3.2. Transparency and Credibility 
The success of monetary authority’s program depends on the private sector’s 
beliefs about monetary authority’s attitude on tomorrow. In many inflation 
targeting countries, government included for defining inflation target. This assures 
that the government will support central bank to reach the target thus increases 
credibility of inflation targeting regime. Batini and Laxton (2007) says that “Inflation 
targets are intrinsically clearer and more easily observable and understandable than 
other targets, since they typically do not change over time and are controllable by 
monetary means” (Batini & Laxton, 2007). Without credibility, the program faces 
with time inconsistency problem. Since past and current inflation are already driven 
by the market and cannot be controlled, inflation targeting regime aims to control 
future inflation rate. In other words the main purpose of inflation target is to create 
a credible medium-term anchor for inflation expectations. Özdemir (2005) asserts 
that “provided that the Bank’s explanations for deviations are credible, they need 
not damage the credibility of its monetary policy. The policies that are not credible 
in the eyes of private sector (create dynamic time inconsistency) are impossible to 
be successful” (p. 45). 
The importance of transparency is to increase discipline, which also helps to 
increase credibility. Khan (2003) explains transparency as follows: “transparency 
implies the following: first, the explicit announcement of inflation targets, second, 
availability of clear and sufficient information to the public to assess the stance of 
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monetary policy, third, the announcement of any changes in monetary policy, a 
clear explanation of the reasons behind the changes, and the expected impact on 
the inflation outlook; fourth an ex-ante indication of a possible target breach, its 
causes and the policy actions that will be taken to bring inflation back on track; and 
finally, ex-post comprehensive analysis of the performance of monetary policy.” (p. 
11). If the central bank cannot be transparent enough and the players on the 
market cannot reach information about the targets and the policies applied to reach 
the target, regime may lose its credibility in their eye. Therefore, transparency and 
credibility are considered together and must be satisfied together to be successfully 
implementing inflation targeting regime. 
3.3. Having Only One Target 
Another important pre-condition of inflation targeting is monetary policy to aim 
only price stability not having other targets like foreign exchange rate, growth or 
unemployment rate. Otherwise, the policies applied for achieving monetary size or 
nominal variables may conflict with inflation targeting program. Fraga (2003) says 
that “One of the main advantages of an inflation targeting regime is the definition 
of a clear target for monetary policy. The existence of another target affects the 
credibility of the main goal of monetary policy” (Arminio Fraga, 2003). For these 
reasons, management of monetary policy should not orient to seniorage to 
compensate financial needs or to reach another nominal variable like foreign 
exchange rates. Since defining a target inflation rate adamantly puts a limit to 
inflation dynamics, it provides an environment to economic agents to build their 
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expectations without uncertainty and provides stabilization in expectations 
therefore makes it possible to reach the target.    
Kadıoğlu et al. (2000) point out another reason to why having one target is 
important for inflation targeting regime. They said that if there is another target, 
public may not believe that the inflation target has the priority, and they may set 
their expectations according to their beliefs. In their words “In that case, the public 
will make their own comments about the policy actions and there is no guarantee 
that the policy stance will give the exact signals about the actions and will cause 
true comments.” (p. 19) Therefore, having more than one target may destroy the 
credibility as well as the possibility of success of the regime.  
3.4. Achieving Fiscal Discipline 
In the countries planning to start inflation targeting regime, having a strong 
financial and banking sector increases the possibility of success. Because, monetary 
instruments that are going to be used to reach inflation target, may drain banking 
system or failures happen in banking sector may make it difficult to reach the 
target. Fraga (2003) explains this problem as “In the case of fiscal and financial 
dominance, the problems that arise on the monetary policy front are quite similar: 
the fear that one or both regimes will break down will increases the probability that 
the government will inflate in the future, and therefore, increases expected 
inflation” (Arminio Fraga, 2003). For a successful monetary policy applied by central 
bank, the applied policies must be supported by fiscal policies. Otherwise, the 
effects of monetary policy may be counteracted by fiscal policies. Achieving fiscal 
discipline depends on achieving the following conditions: 
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 Not having fiscal dominance 
 Not using central bank resources by public 
 Having broad income by government so not depending on seniorage. 
 Having deep financial markets that would be able to absorb public sector 
borrowing needs.  
In order to successfully implement inflation targeting regime, a country should have 
the above conditions as well. Otherwise, country becomes fragile to fiscal oriented 
inflationist pressures. To prevent from conflicting behaviors of fiscal and monetary 
policies, inflation target should be defined together by government and central 
bank.  
3.5. Having Related and Effective Instruments 
In order to execute how central bank’s policy applications effects ultimate 
objectives like inflation, the changes in the monetary policy instruments’ influence 
process of economy must be known. In other words, a stable relationship is needed 
between monetary policy and inflation in order to monetary policy to take inflation 
under control. An important point that ensures monetary policy’s effectiveness is a 
well defined interaction mechanism. Tutar (2005) explains the relationship as; 
“inflation targeting requires an operational framework that will guide monetary 
authorities to conduct monetary policy. Under this framework, a comprehensive 
relationship is necessary between monetary policy and inflation and inflation must 
be predictable to a certain extent” (p. 19). Central bank chooses a monetary 
aggregate as a guide monetary policy instrument -such as short-term interest rates- 
to be able to control liquidity size of the financial system. The instrument in 
 
 
14 
question must be the tool that will serve the needs of monetary authorities 
perfectly.  
After the crises in 2000 and 2001, inflation targeting started to be implemented in 
Turkey. Therefore, Turkey constitutes an appropriate example to explain which 
factors affected monetary authorities to choose inflation targeting and to show how 
the above mentioned pre-conditions were met. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
HISTORY OF TURKISH ECONOMY 
 
 
 
Turkish economy experienced chronic high inflation since the beginnings of 1980’s. 
Continuous high inflation not only affects economical activity badly but also creates 
social tension. Turkey’s high inflation history can be divided into three periods. 
1980-1989, 1989-1994, 1994-2002. After starting Implicit Inflation targeting in 2002, 
disinflation period took place of high inflation. CBRT started to apply formal 
inflation targeting regime in the beginning of 2006. 
4.1. 1980-1989 Period 
In 1980 Turkey started to use export oriented growth model and financial 
liberalization putted into effect. Starting from 1977, growing balance of payments 
deficits and debts of state economic enterprises lead to a foreign exchange 
financing crisis. Moreover expansionary monetary policy used because of wrong 
economical policies of the government. To be able to get rid of the bad effects of 
these factors, on 24 January 1980, Turkey started to apply a stabilization program 
supported by IMF. With this program to control inflation, tight monetary policy was 
used and domestic demand was tried to 
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 be reduced by lowering prices. The first period of the program gave priority to the  
short-term  objectives.  The  program  had  also  included  applications to enhance 
exports of goods and services. In line with this strategy, Turkish Lira (TL) was 
devaluated and manufacturing industry was encouraged to export with export 
incentives from the government.  
Growth strategy used on this period mainly aimed at boosting productivity and imp 
roving competitive power of the economy. One of the most significant 
characteristics of this period was trying to keep the value of TL low to get advantage 
on export. But this strategy lessened the positive effects of stabilization program on 
inflation. The average inflation of Turkey was 97.09% in 1980, 38.65% in 1981, 29.27 
in 1982, 31.23% in 1983, 48.01% in 1984, 45.54% in 1985, 34.85% in 1986, 38.50% 
in 1987, 68.60% in 1988 and 63.13% in 1989.1  
Figure 1- Inflation in Turkey (1980-1989) 
 
 
With the help of decreasing oil prices and increasing domestic demand in 1986, 
Turkish economy reached a growth rate more than expected. However, this growth 
was caused from the increase in public expenditures and resulted public sector 
                                                     
1
 The inflation rates are CPI’s taken from http://www.inflation.eu 
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borrowing requirement to rise. Growing public deficits and increasing inflation 
caused unbalanced financial markets at the end of 1987. Consequently, tendency to 
exchange TL is strengthened.  
On the other hand, starting from 1986, important changes happen in central 
banking in Turkey. Usta (2003) says that to be able to perform modern central 
banking functions, and apply monetary policies effectively within the scope of 
market mechanism, CBRT expedited corporate structural regularizations about the 
usage of indirect monetary policies in 1986 . For this reason, on April 1986 
Interbank Monetary Market Department and on February 1987 Open Markets 
Department were established and CBRT started to govern financial markets. 
Although inflation decreased and kept under 50% till 1987, monetization to finance 
export incentives and foreign debt burden and devolutionist foreign exchange 
policies resulted the inflation to jump above 60% in 1988 and 1989. On February 
1988 some corrective measures were taken by CBRT. These measures were aiming 
to increase the demand on TL, restrain imports, boost exports, and reduce public 
spending. However, these measures could not assure the expected growth on the 
contrary carry the country into recession because of reducing investments on 
production. 
4.2. 1989-1994 Period 
The most important development that assures monetary policy to be conducted 
healthily was a protocol signed between CBRT and Treasury on March 1989. The 
protocol brought discipline to use CBRT resources to finance public deficits. Another 
important economic development in 1989 was TL to become convertible and capital 
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movements to become liberalized. As a result of this development great amount of 
capital moved into Turkey and the reserves of CBRT increased. However, capital 
inflows weakened the control of CBRT on interests and exchange rates, which 
ended up with appreciated TL.  
In 1990, CBRT prepared a monetary policy that targeting balance-sheet items. With 
the help of government’s efficient financial policies, inflation rate decreased to 
60.36%. In 1991 because of the effects of Gulf War, no monetary program could be 
applied and instead of obtain price stability, financial markets were tried to be 
stabilized. Although a monetary policy was declared in 1992, due to the facts that 
not been able to control budget deficits and financing an important part of these 
deficits through short-term advance from CBRT, the program could not be applied 
properly. In 1993, because of the continuing effects of Gulf War and public sector’s 
borrowing requirement, a new monetary policy could not been declared. Especially 
between the period 1989-1993, as a result of uncontrolled budget deficits and 
financing these deficits by intense domestic borrowing, interest rates stayed high. 
Consequently, hot money flow into the country resulted TL to over valuate.     
A growth period that depends on speculative gains caused a confidence crisis and 
carried the country to a financial crisis at the end of 1993. Although export rates 
stayed at the same level, import rates increased extremely so foreign trade deficit 
almost doubled. To sum up, Turkey faced drastic twin deficit on this period. 
4.3. 1994-2002 Period 
During the second half of the 1990’s the impact of high real interest rates became 
apparent. Further factors were growing budget deficits, foreign trade deficit and 
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incrementally increasing public debt especially domestic debt. High levels of real 
interest rates increased the borrowing requirements of the public sector. This 
created a debt-interest spiral and carried Turkey to a new financial crisis in 1994. 
Since the hot money in country outflow quickly, overnight interest rates went up to 
1000%. Even though TL was devaluated 13.6% on 27 January 1994 foreign exchange 
reserves of CBRT decreased 4 billion US Dollar. Commercial banks increased their 
interest rates on deposits 15% and interest rates on 3-month treasury bills catch up 
90%. Erosion of TL resulted in inflation rate to jump to 103.17%.  
Just after the crisis a contractionary monetary policy program called January 24 
decisions that aimed to decrease public borrowing and increase exports introduced. 
The main target of the stabilization program was increasing exports by decreasing 
public deficits. It was not only a short-term program that was applied to get over 
the impacts of crisis but also a long term economical turnover program. Cevik 
(2006) states that starting point of January 24 decisions is mainly slowing down 
inflation, achieving price stability and mitigating the effects of public sector on 
inflation. To finance this program government contracted a new stand-by 
agreement with IMF in 1995. However, because of the early general elections that 
took place on September 1995, the agreement was ruptured. Unfortunately, no 
stabilization program could be applied properly and lasted efficiently after 1994. 
Especially on the unsecure financial markets, the only growth source left was the 
high interested short-term foreign inflows. But after 1995 even the hot money flow 
could be achieved through very high real interest rates.  
In conclusion, the main characteristics of 1990’s can be enumerated as follows: 
 Political instability 
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 Breakdown on the structural reforms 
 High real interest rates 
 Rapidly increasing debt 
 Instable growth 
 Fragile banking system 
In this period focusing on price stability was hindered for CBRT by the fact that 
budget deficits could not been taken under control. CBRT gave priority to foreign 
exchange rates, interest rates and stability on financial markets to prevent from the 
risk of debt refunding. In this period of high interest rates and fluctuating inflation 
rate, tight monetary policies that are tried to be applied became ineffective, they 
even increased inflationist pressure.  
Asian and Russian crises that aroused in 1997 and 1998 even worsen the situation. 
After 1998, reducing domestic demand, falling export to Russia, increasing 
atmosphere of insecurity on the financial markets, decreasing hot money inflows in 
spite of high interest rates and political uncertainties resulted in a new financial 
crisis. To overcome the crisis in December 1999 Turkey executed an IMF supported 
program that fights against inflation. An inflation target was set (20%) and the 
program used exchange rate as nominal anchor. 
To settle increasing inflation and unsustainable debt, a stabilization program was 
applied in 2000.  The primary objective of this program was reducing inflation 
permanently that used to be at two digit numbers about 25 years. With this 
program, it was intended to create a primary surplus through decreasing public 
expenditures and increasing revenues, public salary increases were proposed to be 
arranged with the inflation targeting rate and Structural reforms were specified 
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especially banking sector reform and privatization were planned to put into 
practice. Although the program was successful in some issues such as sharp 
decrease in interest rates, significantly slowed inflation and increasing production 
and domestic demand some factors canceled out the effects of the program. These 
factors were: 
 over-appreciation of TL,  
 rapid recovery in domestic demand,  
 delays in planned actions for certain important structural reforms,  
 political uncertainties,  
 developments in the Euro/US Dollar parity.  
As a result, Turkey faced September 2000 and February 2001 crises. Just after this 
program’s failure Turkey’s transition program was announced. Floating exchange 
rate regime was started to be used. The main objective of the program was 
restructuring the economy and achieving lasting stability and restoring confidence 
in the markets. The ultimate goal of the program was to achieve an increase in 
growth, investment and employment. On the introduction of the program CBRT 
(2000) states the objectives as:  
“We aim to create an environment for sustainable growth, to increase the efficiency 
of resource utilization, and to develop our competitive strength through ensuring 
an open economy functioning under free market conditions. Our ultimate goal is to 
achieve an increase in growth, investment and employment that will instill 
confidence in our people for their future and lead to a permanent increase in their 
standard of living.” (p. 14) 
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The most important improvement was the changed law of CBRT. New law (that is 
still in effect) states that the main objective of CBRT is to achieve price stability and 
gives instrument independence to CBRT for this reason.   
4.4. 2002-2006 Period 
On the CBRT’s report “the monetary policy and exchange rate policy in 2002” 
inflation targeting concept was mentioned for the first time. In 2002, CBRT designed 
its monetary policy depending on two nominal anchors, monetary targeting and 
inflation targeting. The Governor of CBRT announced in his speech about monetary 
policy in 2002 that CBRT will focus on the “future inflation”, in other words, CBRT 
started an “implicit inflation targeting” in 2002. It is also announced that, CBRT will 
switch to official inflation targeting when necessary conditions emerge later in the 
year. The program was aiming to bring down inflation to 12% within 3 years, and 
then to single digits.  
With the help of the program that is put into process after the great depression in 
2001 and that gave importance to financial discipline, Turkish economy recovered 
significantly.  
Short-term interest rates were set as the main monetary policy instrument by CBRT 
in 2002. Although it is not announced targeted inflation was 35% and realized 
annual CPI was 26.42 for 2002. The same monetary policies continued in 2003 and 
2004. While the inflation target was 20%, realized annual inflation rate was 17.04% 
for 2003. Similarly the target was 12%; the realized annual CPI was 8.97%. 
 In 2002 - 2004 period, both inflation slowed down and high growth rates were 
achieved. Since the targeted inflation rates were achieved to be realized, reliability 
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of inflation targeting regime was improved. Although fall in inflation rate slow down 
in 2005, it continued. The improvements about structural reforms, resolutely 
continuing middle term program, strengthening financial stability and other 
developments help New Turkish Lira to keep its strong position. CBRT started to 
reduce short-term interest rates as a monetary policy instrument.  
Starting from January 2005, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meets regularly 
under the chairmanship of the governor to discuss the developments in inflation 
and economy. Decisions on interest rates are announced taking into account the 
evaluations of the MPC meeting on the following business day. In the beginning of 
2005, CBRT announced in its report “Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy in 2005” 
that formal inflation targeting will be launched at the beginning of 2006.   
4.5. 2006-2011 Period 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Target 5,0 4,0 4,0 7,5 6,5 5,5 5,0 5,0 
Realized 9,7 8,4 10,1 6,5 6,4 - - - 
 
As a result of monetary and fiscal policies applied together with a harmonious and 
decisive manner, inflation fall to the single digit levels in company with high growth 
rates. The rapid growth starting from 2002 is continued in 2006 and 2007. The 
fluctuations on the financial markets on may and June 2006 caused YTL to 
depreciate and interest rates to increase on the second half of 2006. These events 
became the source of the deceleration in the growth rate. With the help of keeping 
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fiscal discipline pertinaciously and structural reforms on the public sector affected 
price dynamics positively.  
The negative effects of global crises arise from USA mortgage crises are felt in the 
economical activities in 2008. Fiscal measures taken against crises caused public 
expenditures to increase and narrowing domestic economical activity caused tax 
revenues to decrease. In 2009, CBRT started to apply policies that will limit the 
negative effects of the crises on economic stability provided that they will not 
conflicting with price stability target. Since the negative effects of crises started to 
disappear in 2010, CBRT announced its new policy as a series of new precautions 
that are aiming to increase the efficiency of monetary policy and limiting the macro 
financial risks. In November 2010 CBRT started to apply a new monetary policy that 
is a composition of some monetary policy tools such as interest corridor and 
required reserves. Başçı (2011) explains the main difference between this new 
policy from the previous one as, as well as price stability, financial stability is also 
look out for and for this reason besides weekly repo tender interests, required 
reserves and active liquidity management are used as supportive policy 
instruments. To prevent from breaking down the inflation expectations because of 
the differentiation of objective function, CBRT maintain an active communication 
strategy.  
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Figure 2- Inflation in Turkey (2002-2011) 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
DISCUSSION  
 
 
 
As we mention earlier, transparency has great importance in inflation targeting 
regime. Depending on transparency, communication strategies of central bank gain 
importance, Mishkin says that “Transparency and communication, especially when 
it demonstrates the success in achieving a pre-announced and well-defined inflation 
target, has also helped build public support for a central bank's independence and 
for its policies” (Mishkin, 2004) In this part of the thesis communication strategies 
of CBRT will be compared with other two inflation targeting countries, both of 
which are industrial countries, namely Central Bank of Norway (Norges Bank) (NB), 
and National Bank of Polond (NBP). We will try to see the similarities and the 
differences between the three central bank’s strategies. We will focus on the 
interest rate projections and the press conferences that NB applies but CBRT not. 
Another important focus is publishing the MPC voting results which is the major 
difference between the NBP and CBRT. We will try to discuss the difference 
between the strategies of central banks. Moreover we will try to find  out  if  CBRT  
should  be  more  transparent  by publishing projections of 
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future interest rates and/or holding press conferences and/or publishing MPC 
voting results like NB, NBP and some other central banks doing.  
5.1. Communication Strategies of CBRT 
CBRT announced in its publication about monetary policy for 2002 that the final 
target of monetary policy was the adoption of inflation targeting regime, but as the 
reliability of the regime would suffer in case this adoption was made prematurely; 
without satisfying the necessary pre-conditions. It was also pointed out in the same 
announcement that “implicit inflation targeting” would be implemented until the 
adoption of the inflation targeting regime. Between the periods 2001-2005, 
considerable progress was made in the formation of a suitable environment for the 
transition to an inflation targeting regime. CBRT chose “point target” as inflation 
target since it is easily understandable and it has advantages about communication 
and it announces a target policy for three years. Moreover, it is decided to define 
inflation target as consumer price index (CPI) because it can be viewed by everyone 
and it measures daily life expenditures well. However, since CPI is a comprehensive 
index, inflation may show deviations arise from the factors that are outside the 
control of monetary policy.  
Furthermore, very significant steps were taken about the communication strategies 
of CBRT as a part of transparency. CBRT extended its communication tools. Regular 
communication tools of CBRT are: 
 Inflation report 
 Monthly policy statement 
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Moreover, CBRT publishes many reports in part of the communication strategy. 
These reports are: 
 Monthly price developments 
 Independent audit reports 
 Financial stability report 
 Balance of payments report 
 Monetary policy reports 
 CBRT bulletin 
 Quarterly bulletin 
 Annual reports 
Like many other inflating targeting central bank CBRT uses short-term interest rates 
as the key policy instrument to reach the targeted inflation. During the implicit 
inflation targeting period CBRT took some measures to make monetary policy more 
institutionalized. For example, monetary policy committee (MPC) meetings are 
done on the date that is defined and announced to public earlier. And the decision 
of interest rates is announced the business day after these meetings at 9:00am. 
After the announcement of the decisions a text is published including the views of 
the committee members also the reason for the decision. These texts not also give 
the reason of the decision but also give signals about the future decisions. Fraga 
(2003) states that “the timely publication of the detailed minutes of MPC meetings 
is a key ingredient for an effective communications starategy. In emerging 
economies, where credibility is typically lower than one would like, the benefits of 
publishing this information can be substantial” (Arminio Fraga, 2003). 
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5.2. Communication Strategies of NB 
Norges Bank is also an inflation targeting central bank. The bank’s aim is to promote 
economic stability in Norway. The objectives are enumerated as price stability, 
financial stability and added value in investment management on their web site. 
With the Government regulation of 29 March 2001, NB implemented inflation 
targeting regime starting from a target inflation rate 2.5 per cent for 2001.  NB 
publishes the inflation report three times a year which provides an analysis of the 
outlook for the Norwegian economy and of developments in price and cost inflation 
two years ahead. The bank announces the dates of MPC meetings. The executive 
board discusses interest rate settings and other changes in the use of monetary 
policy instruments. The decisions of executive board are announced immediately 
after the meetings. Besides, the factors under the decisions are announced on a 
press conference by the Governor or a deputy Governor of the NB. 
 Norges Bank publishes monetary policy report three times a year. On the web site 
of NB it is explained as “the report assesses the interest rate outlook and includes 
projections for developments in the Norwegian economy, discussion of specific 
topics and a summary of Norges Bank’s regional network reports”.  
The realized CPI’s2 in Norway before and after implementing inflation targeting are 
given below tables. Norway had already experiencing a disinflationary period before 
starting inflation targeting regime. NB fixed target inflation at 2.5% but the realized 
inflation rate was always lower than the target. 
 
                                                     
2
 CPI’s are taken from the web site of Norges Bank (http://www.norges-bank.no/en/) 
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Figure 3- Inflation in Norway (1990-2001) 
  
 
Figure 4- Inflation in Norway (2002-2011) 
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announce treasury bills and government bonds rates on daily, monthly and yearly 
bases. The main criteria that they give weight while preparing their interest rate 
forecast are given in their web site as follows: 
 The interest rate should be set with a view to stabilizing inflation at target or 
bringing it back to target after a deviation has occurred.  
 Interest rate developments should at the same time be able to provide a 
reasonable balance between the path for inflation and the path for overall 
capacity utilization in the economy.   
They also find the following additional criteria useful because of the potential 
effects of asset prices on stability in output, employment and inflation: 
 The interest rate should normally be altered gradually and in line with the 
Bank’s previous response pattern. 
 Interest rate developments should result in acceptable developments in 
inflation and output also under alternative assumptions concerning the 
economic situation and the functioning of the economy. It should be possible 
to explain any substantial and systematic deviations from simple, robust 
monetary policy rules (Gjedrem, 2010). 
5.3. Communication Strategies of National Bank of 
Poland 
National Bank of Poland is an inflation targeting central bank since 1999. Within the 
framework of this strategy, the Monetary Policy Council defines the inflation target 
and then adjusts the NBP basic interest rates in order to maximize the probability of 
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achieving the target. The set of monetary policy instruments used by the NBP 
enables it to determine interest rates on the market. These instruments include 
open market operations, reserve requirements and credit-deposit operations. Like 
Norges Bank, NBP has a fixed inflation target at 2.5% since 2004, but unlike Norges 
Bank NBP has also a fluctuation band of +/- 1 percentage point. NBP publishes the 
following reports about their monetary policy: 
 Inflation Report 
 Monetary Policy Guidelines 
 Report on Monetary Policy Implementation 
 Monetary Policy Strategy beyond 2003 
 Medium-Term Monetary Policy Strategy, 1999-2003 
NBP also publishes Information Bulletins on a monthly basis which includes 
information about overall economic and financial performance in Poland and on the 
policies of the central bank. 
After MPC meetings NBP publishes press releases. Starting from April 2011, the 
National Bank of Poland is publishing the motions on its website relating to interest 
rates, together with a breakdown of votes cast by individual MPC members. 
The realized CPI’s for Poland are given in NBP’s web site as follows: 
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Figure 5- Inflation in Poland (2001-2011) 
 
After implementing inflation targeting regime, Poland had a very volatile inflation 
rate. 
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banks publishes reports about their monetary policies to give clues to the market 
and provide credibility. Monetary policy reports are important for the participants 
of financial markets because they include the information about whether there will 
be changes in the monetary policy on the next term or not. Inflation reports are 
published to summarize the conditions that affect inflation. The reasons of 
deviations from the target –if any- are explained in these reports. Central banks 
account for the realized inflation in front of public and governments because they 
are responsible to assure the inflation to be in line with the pre-announced target. 
5.4.1. Press Conferences: an Important Transparency Tool 
Financial markets follow the MPC decisions closely. The interest rate decisions 
taken on the MPC meetings are very important for the participants. Therefore, 
central banks announce their decisions to provide the necessary information to the 
markets as soon as possible. One of the three central banks (CBRT, NBP and NB) of 
interest on this paper, namely Norges Bank announces their MPC decisions by 
means of press conferences after the meetings. On the other hand CBRT and NBP 
publish a press release after the meeting, not hold a press conference about the 
meeting. Press conference provides more transparency, because central bank does 
not answer questions from the press by a press release.  Norwegian press members 
have the opportunity to ask questions about the decisions of the committee on the 
press conference. CBRT can improve its transparency by starting to hold press 
conferences. A press conference provides an interrelation between the central bank 
and the public. Reports are important tools however no matter how detailed the 
reports are, they may not answer all the questions in minds. Having regular press 
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conferences not only improves transparency but also improves credibility indirectly. 
Therefore, CBRT is suggested to hold regular press conferences after the MPC 
meetings to improve its communication skills.  
5.4.2. MPC Voting Results 
Central Bank of Poland started to publish voting results of MPC meeting early this 
year (2011). This communication strategy is not applied by CBRT. Publishing voting 
results of MPC meetings is a way to increase transparency. In inflation targeting 
regime, central banks try to be more transparent to increase the credibility of the 
regime. This strategy is not requires so much preliminary preparations because it is 
easy to apply and is not includes risks. Therefore to become more transparent and 
improve the applied regime CBRT is suggested to publish voting results of MPC 
meetings. 
5.4.3. Interest Rate Forecasts: a Major Difference 
The main difference between NB and CBRT appears about interest rate forecast. NB 
publishes key interest rate forecasts and defines these forecasts as their most 
important monetary policy instruments. They give different weights to different 
criteria and define a loss function including these criteria. Gjerdem (2010) asserts 
that “The interest rate forecast is an expression of a balance between various 
monetary policy considerations and a response pattern that households, firms and 
financial institutions can build on. The interest rate forecast is based on our 
understanding of the functioning of the economy” (p. 1). Not surprisingly, there 
may be differences in projections for inflation and economic activity in one report 
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to another. Therefore, the forecasts for interest rates may also change. NB tries to 
exemplify the factors that affect the changes in the interest rate forecast through 
their effects on the prospects for inflation, output and employment. The forecasts 
have shifted considerably over time. This reflects that the interest rate is an 
instrument that should react to all news that may influence the inflation outlook.  
On the other hand, while sharing predictions of inflation by means of inflation 
reports, CBRT explains qualitatively how policy interest rate will process but not 
publishes quantitative forecasts. Moreover, as discussed in the “history of Turkey” 
section, CBRT have been applying a new policy combination since November 2010. 
After starting the new policy, instead of giving tangible knowledge about interest 
rate policy, CBRT prefers to communicate on policy combination and “monetary 
tightening”. To give a more specific perspective about the size of the monetary 
tightening, a numerical range is articulated in the inflation report. 
Researchers and central bankers are arguing weather more transparent central 
banks are beneficial or harmful for achieving targets. Only a few central banks are 
publishing their projections about future interest rates so far. More specifically they 
give not only comments about their future path of interest rate policy but also 
numerical forecasts. A study about the value of greater transparency by Rudebusch 
et al. (2008) shows that, under reasonable conditions, publication of interest rate 
projections better aligns the expectations of the public as a result central bank 
better meets its macroeconomic goals. 
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5.4.4. Is Turkish Economy Ready for Projections? 
Most central banks with direct inflation targets are communicating their inflation 
and output forecasts to the public. Some banks have gone one step further by 
showing their expected future path of interest rates. A comparison of the methods 
applied by central banks in preparing and releasing their forecasts indicates that in 
many areas there are no unique solutions. Moreover, the profession is still far from 
consensus as regards macroeconomic effects of forecasts publication. What we 
need to argue is that if publishing interest rate forecasts strategy is suitable for 
Turkish economy. It does not seem suitable because unlike Norwegian economy, 
Turkish economy is an emerging market economy. Being a small open economy, 
Turkish economy is vulnerable to shocks. Central bank should be able to use 
currently available information about future shocks –which is not always possible- 
in order to meaningfully discuss forecasts of future interest rates.  
In contrast to the results of Rubusch et al. (2008), Wyplosz et al. (2008) showed that 
dominance of transparency depends on the conditions of economy. They 
analytically test it and find that the parameters matter, being more transparent is 
not always more advantageous. They describe the economy with the standard New-
Keynesian log-linear model including a Philips curve: 
      
              
In this equation,   shows the expectations and    shows the realized inflation rate, 
also    is the output gap and    is a random disturbance uniformly distributed over 
the real line, with an improper distribution and a zero unconditional mean. Without 
loss of generality, they assume a zero rate of time preference so that R=1.  
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They found that current inflation depends on current and expected shocks and on 
current and expected policy interest rates. This implies that the central bank must 
take into account the effect of its current and future decisions on market 
expectations. They found that the welfare loss under full transparency is: 
   
             
 
       
 
 
   
 
They denote the relative precision of the central bank and the private sector signals 
as   
 
 
 and assume that       and the parameter   measures the relative 
precision of early signals vis a vis the updated signals. According to their analyses, 
comparing transparency (publishing interest rate forecasts) and opacity (not 
publishing future interest rate forecast) in terms of welfare, parameters may 
change the result. They conclude that transparency dominates when   is large and 
when   is large. “The role of   is ambiguous: when   is small, an increase in   favors 
opacity while it favors transparency when   is large” (p. 15). 
A similar study is done by the same authors in 2008 and they analyze welfare in this 
second study. To compare the two regimes (transparency and opacity) they looked 
at the difference between welfare functions calculated for the two regimes.  
             They compared the welfare losses separately period by period. 
They found that “the transparency is always welfare increasing in period 2” (p. 22). 
The second result of the paper states that if the central bank signal α is more 
precise that the private sector signal β then it is more likely that transperency pays 
off. Conversely, if the central bank signal is poor quality it can not be said exactly 
that trasnperency is better.  
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In order to be sure that if implementing this strategy to Turkish economy is 
beneficial or not, we should know how these parameters behave in Turkish 
economy. CBRT’s signal about private sector expectations are comes from the 
“survey of expectations” that CBRT conducts twice a month, in the first and third 
weeks of every month. CBRT explains in information note on survey of expectations 
that the sample size is small since the participation is voluntarily. CBRT treats 
individual responses as strictly confidential in conducting this survey. The first part 
of the survey is “expectation of consumer price index” which is composed of five 
subparts. Expected CPI for the current month, expected CPI for the next month, 
expected CPI for the second month ahead, expected annual CPI by the end of the 
year, expected annual CPI by the end of the next 12 months and expected annual 
CPI by the end of the next 24 months are estimated throughout this survey. CBRT’s 
signal α is coming from this first part of survey of expectations. Although very 
important steps are taken to increase the reliability of the survey, such as revision 
of the questions and the improvements of the economical conditions that affect the 
expectations of the public, central bank signal can be said to be poor quality in 
comparison with an industrialized country.  
Furthermore, Kara et al. (2005) studied about the rationality of inflation 
expectations in Turkey. They ask the question whether they are forward looking or 
backward looking. In other words they tried to answer whether inflation 
expectations provide an unbiased predictor of future inflation, and/or whether they 
are formed by making efficient use of all available information in the economy. 
They tested unbiasedness and efficiency separately to infer about the rationality of 
Turkish inflation expectations. They found that all the expectation series are biased 
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and inefficient, therefore not rational. Therefore, central bank signal α is proved to 
be poor in Turkey by this paper which implies that transparency causes greater 
welfare loss in Turkey comparing to the opacity according to the results of Wyplosz 
et al. (2008).  
Another disadvantage of publishing interest rate forecasts is its complication. 
Mishkin (2004) states that if the increase in transparency violates the KISS (Keep It 
Simple Stupid) principle, than it might not help the Central Bank to do its job and 
focus on the long run objective.  Projection of policy rate path is understandable by 
economists but not all the participants on the market are economists, public may be 
confused about the policy of central bank. Interpreting the projections is important 
because a misunderstanding about the future policy may result in wrong decisions 
about the future economic activities. Moreover, if the misunderstanding becomes 
widespread, it may affect the whole economy and even result in moving away from 
the targeted inflation.  
Publishing interest rate forecasts and becoming too transparent may harm CBRT’s 
credibility. The reason is as follows. There are a lot of factors that affect the 
forecasts of future interest rates. In case of one of the factors have a change the 
forecast may need to be changed. Publishing a change in the previous policy 
announcement, public may confuse and view it as a mistake of central bank. It may 
destroy central bank’s credibility in public’s eyes. Because credibility is a concept 
that is hard to gain and sustain but is easy to lose.  
Under these conditions suggesting to become more transparent to CBRT would not 
be a creditworthy suggestion. However, in light of the studies done on this subject, 
publishing interest rate forecasts seem to be the next step to be taken to become 
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more transparent. Being more transparent under the right conditions results in 
increasing credibility of the regime and therefore increasing the possibility of the 
success of the regime. What we can suggest to CBRT is to mature its conditions and 
then take the step of publishing future interest rate forecasts in the near future. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
By the end of 1980’s harmful effects of high and volatile inflation are proved both 
by academic researches and by practical experiences. Having realized this fact 
achieving price stability became the most important issue for central banks and 
politicians. In 1990 New Zealand introduced a new approach to achieve and 
maintain price stability -inflation targeting approach. Since then researchers and 
policy makers made efforts to find the optimal way of performing this regime. Pre-
conditions are defined to successfully implement inflation targeting.  
In this study, necessary conditions of inflation targeting are studied. History of 
Turkish economy is explained and the conditions that carry Turkey to apply inflation 
targeting regime are discussed. Turkish economy went through very severe 
economic crises, tried many economic programs to recover, applied different 
monetary policies to achieve financial stability. Finally, Central Bank of the Republic 
of Turkey chose inflation targeting regime in 2001. During 2001-2006 period, CBRT 
implemented implicit inflation targeting regime while trying to accommodate pre-
conditions of inflation targeting. 
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Central bank independence was provided first of all by its new law. By the support 
of the government, all the pre-conditions were tried to be met. Eventually, in 2006 
Turkey started formal inflation targeting and continues with this strategy to achieve 
price stability.  
In this study, communication strategies of CBRT are compared with communication 
strategies of NBP and NB. The main difference between the CBRT and NB is defined 
as the projections of future interest rates. This strategy is defined and discussed if it 
is a suitable strategy for CBRT or not. In conclusion, it is stated that the Turkish 
economy is not ready for publishing interest rate forecast because of some 
immature market conditions. It is suggested to start publishing interest rate 
forecasts after maturing the conditions so that CBRT can improve its credibility and 
possibility of success indirectly by improving its transparency. Another difference of 
communication strategies between the two central banks is distinguished as the 
press conferences that NB is doing but CBRT does not. For being a useful way of 
communicating with the public, press conferences are suggested to be used as a 
supplementary tool for CBRT. Only one difference is defined between the 
communication strategies of CBRT and NBP. Unlike CBRT, NBP newly started to 
publish voting results of MPC meetings. CBRT is suggested to apply this strategy in 
order to improve its transparency and therefore its credibility indirectly.  
Having decided to implement inflation targeting regime, CBRT tried to take the 
steps to successfully implement the regime so far. Henceforward, CBRT should 
concentrate on improving its strategies and take the necessary steps concerted with 
this purpose. 
 
 
44 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
 
Arminio Fraga, I. G. (2003). Inflation Targeting in Emerging Market Economies. 
NBER Macroeconomics Annual , c11446. 
Başçı, E., & Kara, H. (2011 ). Finansal İstikrar ve Para Politikası. Ankara: Türkiye 
Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası. 
Batini, N., & Laxton, D. (2007). Under What Conditions Can İnflation Targeting Be 
Adopted? Chile. 
Çevik, M. (2006). Anti enflasyonist istikrar politikaları ve 1980 sonrası dönemde 
Türkiye ekonomisi analizi: döviz kuruna dayalı istikrar politikaları. Muğla: T.C. 
Muğla Üniversitesi. 
Duman, A. (2002). Inflation Targeting As A Monetary Policy And Its Applicability To 
Developing Countries. Ankara: The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey 
Research Department. 
Frederic S. Mishkin, K. S. (2006). Monetary Policy Under Inflation Targeting: An 
Introduction. Central Bank of Chile. 
Gjedrem, S. (2010). Norges Bank. Retrieved from http://www.norges-bank.no/en/: 
http://www.norges-bank.no/en/about/published/speeches/2010/692010-
cme-lecture/ 
Glenn D. Rudebusch, J. C. (2008). Revealing the Secrets of the Temple The Value of 
Publishing Central Bank Interest Rate Projections. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Greenspan, A. (2001). “Opening Remarks.” In Achieving Price Stability:A Symposium 
Sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas. Books for Business. 
Toronto. 
Kadıoğlu, F., Özdemir, N., & Yılmaz, G. (2000). Inflatıon Targeting In Developing 
Countries. Ankara: The Central Bank Of The Republic Of Turkey Research 
Department. 
Kara, A. H. (2006). Turkish Experience with Implicit Inflation Targeting. Ankara: The 
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey. 
 
 
45 
Kara, H., & Tuğer, H. K. (2005). Some Evidence on the (Ir)rationality of Inflation 
Expectations in Turkey. Ankara: The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey. 
Khan, M. S. (2003, March). Current Issues in the Design and Conduct of Monetary 
Policy. IMF Working Paper . 
Mishkin, F. S. (2004). Can Central Bank Transparency Go Too Far? NBER Working 
Paper Series , 10829. 
Mishkin, F. S. (2000). Inflation Targeting In Emerging Market Countries. Cambridge: 
National Bureau Of Economıc Research. 
Özdemir, M. (2005). Enflasyon Hedeflemesi Teorisi: Gelişmekte Olan Ülkelerde 
Uygulanabilirliği ve Türkiye. Bursa: T.C. Uludağ Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler 
Enstitüsü. 
Paul R. Masson, M. A. (1998). Can Inflation Targeting Be a Framework for Monetary 
Policy in Developing Countries? Finance & Development , 34-37. 
Pierre Gosselin, A. L. (2008). Publication of Interest Rate Forecasts by the Central 
Bank. Banque de France. 
Pierre Gosselin, A. L. (2008). The Expected Interest Rate Path: Alignment of 
Expectations vs. Creative Opacity. International Journal of Central Banking. 
Strengtining the Turkish Economy. (2000). Retrieved from Central Bank of the 
Republic of Turkey: http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/yeni/eng/ 
Tutar, E. (2005). Enflasyon Hedeflemesinin Önkoşulları: Türkiye'de Para Politikası 
Araçları ile Enflasyon Arasındaki İlişkinin İncelenmesi. Ankara: Central Bank of 
the Republic of Turkey. 
Tutar, E. (2002). Inflation Targeting in Developing Countries and Its Applicability to 
the Turkish Economy. Virginia: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State 
University. 
Usta, B. (2003). Enflasyon Hedeflemesi: Gelişmekte Olan Ülkelere Uygulanabilirliği 
ve Türkiye Örneği. Ankara: Central Bank of The Republic of Turkey. 
